Degree of Diligence a Director Must Exercise to Avoid Liability to the Corporation by Keller, Robert J.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 7
Issue 3 Volume 7, Issue 3 (1923) Article 5
Degree of Diligence a Director Must Exercise to
Avoid Liability to the Corporation
Robert J. Keller
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Robert J. Keller, Degree of Diligence a Director Must Exercise to Avoid Liability to the Corporation, 7 Marq. L. Rev. 159 (1923).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol7/iss3/5
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
DEGREE OF DILIGENCE A DIRECTOR MUST
EXERCISE TO AVOID LIABILITY TO
THE CORPORATION
"A corporation is an imaginary being. It has no mind but the
mind of its servants; it has no voice but the voice of its servants;
and it has no hands with which to act but the hands of its ser-
vants. All its schemes of mischief, as well as its schemes of
public enterprise, are conceived by human minds and executed by
human hands; and these minds and hands are its servants' minds
and hands." 1 A corporation can, therefore, act only through the
agency or intervention of human beings. Directors are the ex-
clusive, executive representatives of the corporation, and in them
is vested the management of the ordinary corporate affairs.'
While directors are often spoken of as trustees of the corpora-
tion,3 their true relation to it is that of its agents. The Court in
Wallace vs. Lincoln Sa,. Bank, 89 Tenn. 630, 15 S. W. 488, says:
Directors are not express trustees. The language of Special Judge
Ingersol in Shea vs. Mabry, i Lea (Tenn.) 319, that "directors are trustees,"
etc., is rhetorically sound, but technically inexact; it is a statement often
found in opinions, but is true only to a limited extent. They are mandatorie!;
they are agents; they are trustees in the sense that every agent is a trustee
for his principal, and bound to exercise diligence and good faith; they do
not hold the legal title and more often than otherwise are not the officers
of the corporation having possession of the corporate property; they are
equally interested with those they represent; they more nearly represent
the managing partners in a business firm than a technical trustee. At most
they are implied trustees in whose favor the statutes of limitations do run.'
The directors as executive agents of the corporation, like all
agents, occupy a fiduciary relation demanding obedience, dili-
gence and good faith, and, if they are guilty of misfeasance or
malfeasance, the corporation may at once bring an action at law
to enforce any such violation of duty.
This artice will be confined to a discussion of the obligation of
directors to exercise diligence in the performance of their duties,
with special reference to what degree of care and diligence they
must exercise to avoid liability to the corporation for losses sus-
tained through their negligence.
'Goddard vs. Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada, 57 Me. 2o2, 2 Am. Rep. 39.
'McKee vs. Chautauqua Asse-mbly, i3O Fed. 536.
'Cook vs. Berlin Woolen Mill Co., 43 Wis. 433.
'See article "Relation of the Directors to the Corporation and the Stock-
holders"; 5 Marquette Law Rev., 169.
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RULES OF AGENCY APPLICABLE TO DIRECTORS
In general it may be said that all the rules applicable to the
liability of agents to their principals apply to directors as agents
of the corporation. Says Hamersly, J., in New Haven Trust Co.
vs. Doherty, 75 Conn. 555, 54 At. 209, 96 Am. St. Rep. 239:
A director of a stock corporation when acting for it in the conduct of
its business, is its agent. . . Like every agent, he may be personally
responsible to his principal for negligence or misconduct in conducting the
business intrusted to him .... But there is no general rule of
liability for wrongful neglect in the exercise of such agency, applicable
to directors as a class by themselves independently of the law which
prescribes and defines the duties and liabilities of agents. The duties and
liabilities of directors must depend in each case upon the terms of their
agency and the particular circumstances of the case.
Pinney, J., in North Hudson Mut. Building and Loan Ass'n
vs. Childs, 82 Wis. 46o, 52 N. W. 6oo, says:
The liability of officers to the corporation for damages caused by
negligent or unauthorized acts rests upon the common-law rule which
renders every agent liable who violates his authority or neglects his duty
to the damage of his principal.
According to the law of agency, an agent receiving compensation
must exercise ordinary care; a gratuitous agent or one serving
without pay is only required to exercise slight care or as it is
sometimes stated he is only liable for gross negligence. If, how-
ever, a person, such as a physician or lawyer, holds himself out
to the public as possessing special skill, he must exercise ordinary
care and skill in every case of which he assumes the charge,
whether in the particular case he has received compensation
or not.
A director or other fiduciary officer of a corporation presump-
tively serves without compensation, and, in the absence of an
express contract, he cannot recover for services performed on
an implied contract.5 Hence, a director may generally be con-
sidered as a gratuitous agent.
In the United States there are three lines of authority as to
the degree of care a director must exercise to avoid liability.
First, in a few states, a director like a gratuitous agent is only
obliged to exercise slight care.
Second, in about ten states, directors, considered in the light
of agents undertaking to perform acts requiring special skill and
'Lowe vs. Ring, 123 Wis. 370.
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knowledge, are bound to manage the affairs of the corporation
using ordinary care defined as the same degree of care and pru-
dence which is generally exercised by business men in the man-
agement of their own affairs, regardless of whether they are
gratuitous directors or receive compensation for their services.
Third, in most of the states, directors must exercise ordinary
care defined as that degree of care which ordinarily prudent men
would exercise under similar circumstances.
SLIGHT CARE AS A TEST OF THE CARE DIRncToas MUST EXERCISE
The courts have in many instances attempted to define the
degree of diligence required of directors and other corporate offi-
cers, to absolve them from liability for negligence. Diligence
may be defined as "such care and prudence as is usually exercised
by persons of common or average care and-prudence, measured
in any given case by the circumstances, and the graver, more
important or valuable the interests involved, and the more immi-
nent the peril, the more is the vigilance required to constitute
diligence." 6 The degree of care depends on the nature of the
trust, duty or subject in hand. Hence, if the trust confided, or
duty imposed, require delicate handling or skilful manipulation,
the requisite degree of diligence rises in proportion to the delicacy
which attends the service.
A greater watchfulness and care are required in the proper
custody and preservation of a diamond, than need be bestowed
on chattels of ordinary value; greater skill and diligence are
exacted in the driving of a steam-locomotive than in driving an
ordinary road-wagon.7 Furthermore, what would be slight neglect
in the care exercised in managing an ordinary corporation might
be gross neglect in the management of a savings bank intrusted
with the savings of a multitude of poor people, depending for its
life upon credit and liable to be wrecked by the breath of suspi-
cion." And hence, what would amount to the requisite diligence
at one time, in one situation, and under one set of circumstances,
might not amount to it at another. Whether a given statement
of facts constitutes negligence is generally a question to be de-
termined by a jury, or by a court exercising the functions of a
jury; and it is difficult in most cases, to decide in advance, or to"
'Diligence, 18 C. J., Page 039.
" Carter vs. Chambers, 79 Ala. 223, 230.
'Himn vs. Cary, 82 N. Y. 65, 37 Am. Rep. 546.
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formulate tests for deciding as a matter of law, whether directors
or other officers have been guilty of that degree of negligence
which will render them liable to the corporation.
All courts agree on the following propositions:
First, that a director is not bound to exercise the highest possi-
ble degree of care-a rule applicable to all agents.9 A director,
however, may be obliged to exercise the greatest possible degree
of care if he expressly agrees to do so.
Second, that a director in the exercise of his discretionary
power as a director is not liable for an error of judgment. In
the language of Mr. Morawetz: "Directors merely undertake to
make honest use of such judgment as they possess. They do not
insure the correctness of their judgment; and they cannot be
charged with the consequences of an honest error of judgment
or accidental mistake in the exercise of their discretionary
powers." 10
Third, that a director is liable in any event for gross negligence
resulting from failure to exercise slight care.
A gratuitous agent or a gratuitous bailee is only liable for gross
negligence. And a few courts applying these rules of agency and
bailments hold that a director should not be held to a greater
degree of care inasmuch as directors prima facie serve without
compensation, and, therefore, are in fact gratuitous agents or
mandatories. "These directors serve without pay. They were
selected by their fellow stockholders to manage gratuitously the
affairs of the association in which they and the other stockholders
were jointly interested. * * * When they have acted fairly,
and have not been guilty of gross neglect or gross inattention,
they should not be held liable. The rule applicable to manda-
tories is sufficiently stringent for such cases, and is a reasonable
one. They should be held liable only in case of fraud, gross
negligence or misuser." 11
It appears that the term "gross negligence" is not uniformly
interpreted. By "gross negligence" some courts intend to signify
no more than want of that care and attention which men of
common prudence ordinarily give to their affairs,12 while other
courts understand the same words as implying that degree of in-
"I Mechem, Agency (2nd Ed.), Sect. 1278.
20I Morawetz, Corporations, Sec. 553.
"Citizens' Building, Loan and Savings Ass'n vs. Coriell, 34 N. J. Eq. 383,
392.
" Him vs. Cary, Supra.
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attention and want of care indicative either of wilful recklessness,
or intent to defraud or permit others to defraud.13 Allow me to
quote Justice Lumpkin in McEwen vs. Kelly, i4o Ga. 720, 79
S. E. 777:
Some courts have declared that they are only liable for gross negligence
or breach of duty resulting in injury. But in some, probably most, of the
cases so declaring, it will be found that the failure of directors to use
ordinary care in supervision has been treated as amounting to gross
negligence.
CARE REQUIRED AS THAT WHICH MEN OF ORDINARY PRUDENCE
EXERCISE IN REGARD TO THEIR OWN AFFAIRS-
THE NEW YORK RULE
In most jurisdictions directors must exercise ordinary or rea-
sonable diligence to avoid liability. Ordinary diligence has been
defined as that degree of care and prudence which a discreet and
cautious person would use in his own affairs were the whole loss
or risk to be his own; or such diligence as an ordinary prudent
and diligent person would exercise under similar circumstances'
The Wisconsin Supreme Court defines ordinary care as such care
as the great mass of mankind ordinarily use in the same or similar
circumstances; and ordinary negligence as the want of such care
as men of ordinary prudence observe in and about their affairs,
or in other words, the want of such care as the great mass of
mankind observe under similar circumstances.---
In the law of agency, bailments and negligence in general, it
appears that there is no difference between the ordinary care
which a careful person exercises in his own affairs and the
ordinary care which a cautious person employs under similar
circumstances.
As applied to the care which directors must exercise, ordinary
care defined as that care which a prudent man would exercise
under similar circumstances is a greater degree of care than
slight care, but not so great a degree of care as that ordinary
care which a cautious person would exercise in the conduct of
his own affairs.
Permit me to quote Judge Earl in Hun vs. Cary, 82 N. Y. 65,
37 Am. Rep. 546:
That trustees of corporations are bound to use some diligence in the
discharge of their duties cannot be disputed. All the authorities so hold.
' King vs. Lizingston Mfg. Co., 192 Ala. 269, 277, 68 S. 897.4Diligence, 18 C. J., p. io4o.
'Dreher vs. Fitchburg, 22 Wis. 675.
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What degree of care and diligence are they bound to exercise? Not the
highest degree, not such as a very vigilant or extremely careful person
would exercise. If such were required, it would be difficult to find trustees
who would incur the responsibility of such positions. It would not be
proper to answer the question by saying the lowest degree. Few persons
would be willing to deposit money in savings banks, or to take stock in
corporations, with the understanding that the directors were bound only
to exercise slight care, such as inattentive persons would give to their own
business, in the management of the large and important interests committed
to their hands. When one deposits money in a savings bank, or takes stock
in a corporation, thus divesting himself of the immediate control of his
property, he expects and has a right to expect, that the trustees or
directors, who are chosen to take his place in the management and control
of his property, will exercise ordinary care and prudence in the trusts
committed to them-the same degree of care and prudence that men
prompted by self interest generally exercise in their own affairs. When
one voluntarily takes the position of trustee or director of a corporation,
good faith, exact justice, and public policy unite in requiring of him
such a degree of care and prudence, and it is a gross breach of duty-
crassa negligentia-not to bestow them.
If a director is recompensed for his services he must exercise
that ordinary care which an agent of a private person would use.
On principle it would seem that a gratuitous director should be
held to that same degree of care. It requires special skill and
knowledge to adequately perfohn the duties of a director just as
it requires special skill and knowledge to perform the duties of
a doctor or lawyer. Professional men in general must exercise
the ordinary skill of professional men in their particular line of
endeavor to escape liability regardless of whether they are paid
or not. Persons are under no obligation to become directors of
a corporation. If they voluntarily accept the responsibilities of
directors, they impliedly assume that they have the requisite
degree of skill and knowledge to properly perform the duties of
directors, and that they will use ordinary care in such perform-
ance. Allow me to quote Judge Earl in Hun vs. Cary, supra, at
page 74:
One who voluntarily takes the position of director, and invites con-
fidence in that relation, undertakes, like a mandatory, with those whom he
represents or for whom he acts, that he possesses at least ordinary
knowledge and skill, and that he will bring them to bear in the discharge
of his duties. Such is the rule applicable to public officers, to professional
men and to mechahics, and such is the rule which must be applicable to
every person who undertakes to act for another in a situation or employ-
ment requiring skill and knowledge; and it matters not that the service
is to be rendered gratuitously.
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From their quasi public position, and the magnitude of the
interests committed to their care, there would be no impropriety
in exacting of directors a higher degree of prudence and care
than that which is required of the agents of private persons.
This, however, has not been done in any of the decided cases. The
farthest that any of the cases go is to require of directors sub-
stantially the same degree of attention, prudence and skill that
would be expected if they had agreed to perform duties of like
nature for private persons. 8 Among the states that follow this
rule are Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, Texas, Utah and Virginia.1
CARE REQUIRED OF DIREcToR AS THAT OF ORDINARILY PRUDENT
MAN UNDER SImILAR CIRCUMSTANcES-THE
WiscoNsIN RULE
On the other hand, it is held in the Federal courts, in Wisconsin,
and in most of the states, that the degree of care required of a
director is not the same ordinary care that he takes of his own
affairs but is the ordinary care of a director of a corporation in
a like business, or, as it is generally put, the degree of care an
ordinarily prudent man would exercise under similar circum-
stances. Judge Sharswood in Spering's.Appeal, 71 Penn. St. ii,
20, says:
They can only be regarded as mandatories-persons who have gratuitously
undertaken to perform certain duties, and who are therefore bound to
apply ordinary skill and diligence, but no more. . . . But it is evident
that gentlemen selected by the stockholders from their own body ought
not to be judged by the same strict standard as the agent or trustee of a
private estate.
In Rankin vs. Cooper, 149 Fed. Ioio, the care required of
directors was laid down as follows:
It is the duty of directors of a national bank to exercise reasonable
control and supervision over its affairs, and to use ordinary care and
diligence in ascertaining the condition of its business, which is such care
as an ordinarily prudent and diligetit man would exercise in view of all
the circumstances.
Directors of a national bank are not insurers of the fidelity and proper
conduct of its executive officers, and are not responsible for losses resulting
from the wrongful acts or omissions of such officers, provided they have
exercised ordinary care in the exercise of their own duties as directors.
SSee Note in 17 Am. St Rep. 95.
4 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Par. 245o.
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If nothing has come to the knowledge of the directors of a national
bank to awaken suspicion that something is going wrong, ordinary attention
to the affairs of the institution, is all that is required of them, but if, on
the other hand, they know, or by the exercise of ordinary care should
know, any facts which should awaken suspicion and put a prudent man on
his guard, then a degree of care commensurate with the danger to be
avoided is required, and a failure to exercise such care makes them
responsible.
Directors of a national bank are not expected to watch the routine of
every day's business, but they should have a general knowledge of the
manner in which the bank's business is conducted, and upon what securities
its larger lines of credit are given, and generally know of and give
direction to its important and general affairs.
In Swentzel vs. Penn. Bank, 147 Pa. St. 140, 23 At. 145, it
was held that "the degree of care required of bank directors who
receive no compensation for their services and whose principal
business is to assist in discounting paper is not that which they
take of their own affairs but the ordinary care of bank directors
in the business of the bank."
In the leading case of North Hudson Mutual Building and Loan
Ass'n vs. Childs, 82 Wis. 46o, at page 476, Judge Pinney lays
down the Wisconsin rule:
That as they (directors) render their services gratuitously, they are not
to be held to the degree of responsibility of bailees for hire, or expected
to devote their whole time and attention to their duties; that they are not,
in the absence of any element of positive misfeasance, and solely on the
ground of passive negligence, to be held liable, unless their negligence is
gross or they are fairly subject to the imputation of a want of good faith.
It is to be remembered that they have the same interests to protect and
subserve as other stockholders, and self-interest naturally prompts them
to look after their own, and the degree of care they are bound to exercise
is that which ordinarily prudent and diligent men would exercise under
similar circumstances in respect to a like gratuitous employment, regard
being had to the usages of business and the circumstances of each particular
case; that they are not liable, in the absence of fraud or intentional breach
of trust, for negligence, mistakes of judgment, and bad management in
making investments on doubtful or insufficient security. Where they have
not profited personally by their bad management, or appropriated any of
the property of the corporation to their own use, courts of equity treat them
with indulgence. Were a more rigid rule to be applied, it would be
difficult to get men of character and pecuniary responsibility to fill such
positions. These views are applicable, we think, to the case of all officers
serving and acting within the scope of their authority gratuitously or
practically so. The rule of liability in case of service for reward is well
understood, and need not be repeated.
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In Killen vs. Barnes, io6 Wis. 546 at page 574, the Court
speaking through Judge Marshall, by way of dicta, considers the
foregoing rule as too lenient. The Wisconsin rule is declared to
be as liberal, if not the most liberal rule, that can be found in the
books. The rule laid down in North Hudson Mut. Bldg. and Loan
Ass'n vs. Childs, supra, however, is affirmed under the doctrine
of stare decisis.
In summary it may be concluded that: i. Directors more
nearly resemble agents than trustees of the corporation. 2. As
such, the rules of agency in general apply to them. 3. In three or
four states, directors are liable only for gross negligence. 4. In
New York and a few other states directors, to escape liability,
must exercise that diligence which the ordinary prudent man
gives to his own affairs. This it is submitted, appears to be the
best reasoned and the logical rule. 5. In Wisconsin and the
majority of the states, directors are not held to such a strict rule;
they are bound only to exercise that care which an ordinary
cautious man would exercise under similar circumstances.
ROBERT J. KELLER, '24.
